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This research investigates the potential effects of the standing disaster assistance program 
proposed in the Senate version of the 2008 Farm Bill.  Results suggest no significant impact on 
producer crop insurance purchase decisions.  Payments under the program should be expected to 
differ considerably across geographic regions and levels of diversification, with the program 
providing the greatest benefit to undiversified producers in more risky production regions (e.g., 
the Southern Plains).   
 
In 1887 then U.S. President Grover Cleveland vetoed an emergency appropriation of $10,000 for 
drought victims in Texas.  He explained his decision by saying that the federal government had 
no “ . . . warrant in the Constitution . . . to indulge a benevolent and charitable sentiment through 
the appropriation of public funds . . . (for) relief of individual suffering which is in no manner 
properly related to the public service” (Barry, 1997:369).  Over time, public perceptions of the 
federal role in disaster relief changed considerably.  By the mid-1970s the federal government 
provided more than 70 percent of the disaster relief funding in the U.S. (Clary, 1985). 
The U.S. government’s role in providing agricultural disaster relief expanded greatly in 
1949 when Congress established a program that would provide low-interest loans to individual 
farmers and ranchers who suffered losses due to natural disasters.  Later the secretary of 
agriculture was given the authority to make direct disaster relief payments to producers who 
participated in federal price and income support programs.  This authority was suspended in 
1981 (and by legislation adopted in subsequent years) for all situations where federal crop 
insurance was available.  Due to the widespread availability of federal crop insurance, this   3 
implied that future federal agricultural disaster payments would require ad hoc authorizing 
legislation. 
  Since 1981, Congress provided such ad hoc legislation is most years.  Between 1987 and 
1994, more than 60 percent of U.S. farms received federal disaster payments at least once with 
many farms receiving payments every year (Barnett, 1999). In some cases the ad hoc legislation 
authorized disaster payments only for specific crops in specific areas that were affected by 
specific natural disasters.  In other cases, the legislation authorized payments for all crops in all 
areas that have been affected by any disaster (including the explosion of the space shuttle 
Columbia over Texas in 2003).  Payments have also been made to livestock producers (primarily 
for forage losses) and to crop producers who were affected by economic emergencies (low 
prices) rather than natural disasters.  All of these ad hoc payments were funded by off-budget 
emergency supplemental appropriations. 
  These ad hoc payments were also made in a context of increasing on-budget funding for 
subsidized crop insurance.  Crop insurance reform legislation was adopted in 1980, 1994 and 
2000 each time with the expressed intent of eliminating or at least reducing the need for ad hoc 
disaster payments (Glauber). These reforms generally increased crop insurance premium 
subsidies to stimulate higher levels of participation.  As a result the cost of the program to the 
government (indemnities net of premiums, premium subsidies, and delivery cost) rose from an 
average of $559 million per year during the period 1981-1993 to an average of $1,919 million 
per year during the period 1994-2003.  Thus, it seems evident that the U.S. has created a dual 
system of subsidized crop insurance and ad hoc disaster payments — programs that would seem 
to be at least somewhat redundant.    4 
  Despite the frequent implementation of ad hoc disaster payments, there has been no 
standing program that would provide disaster payments to farmers and ranchers in the U.S. since 
1981.  This will almost certainly change in 2008.  As this is being written in mid-December 
2007, the U.S. Senate has just adopted its version of the “farm bill” – omnibus legislation that 
authorizes a number of federal agricultural, conservation, food, and rural programs for 
subsequent years (generally, 5 years). The Senate farm bill contains authorization for a standing 
disaster payment program.  The House farm bill (adopted in July) does not contain similar 
authorizing language; however, the chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, 
Congressman Collin Peterson, has expressed his support for a standing disaster payment 
program.  Thus, most political observers believe that a standing disaster payment program will 
be included in the farm bill that emerges from the House-Senate conference committee (which 
will likely convene in January 2008).  
  The standing disaster payment program being proposed in the Senate farm bill is 
significantly different than the program that was in place prior to 1981. For example, the pre-
1981 program was based on yield losses. The proposed program is based on revenue losses. 
Also, the pre-1981 program provided compensation for losses on individual crops while the 
proposed program would provide compensation based on shortfalls in “whole farm” revenue, 
including all crops produced on the farm. 
   To be eligible for the proposed standing disaster payment program, farms would be 
required to purchase at least the catastrophic level of federal crop insurance. The disaster 
payment program would compensate farms for 52 percent of the difference between their 
disaster payment program guarantee and their realized total farm revenue. For purposes of the 
proposed program, realized farm revenue would include market revenue, any crop insurance   5 
indemnities, and 20 percent of any federal direct fixed payments. Other federal income support 
payments (e.g., price or revenue counter-cyclical payments and loan deficiency payments) would 
not be included in revenue to count against the disaster payment program guarantee.
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  The research presented in this paper analyzes the impact of the proposed standing disaster 
payment program.  Specifically, the research: 
1)  Investigates the impact of the proposed standing disaster payment program on federal 
crop insurance purchase decisions; 
2)  Analyzes expected disaster payment benefits for different crops and regions; 
3)  Analyzes expected disaster payment benefits for different degrees of on-farm crop 
diversification; and 
4)  Contrasts the proposed standing disaster payment program with an alternative disaster 
payment structure, specifically focusing on how geographic differences in production risk 
will affect disaster program experience. 
Conceptual Framework 
  When farmers plant crops they are making financial investments in a portfolio of 
enterprises that they hope will generate net income.  In this sense, farmers are no different than 
those who invest in stocks, bonds, or other financial assets. 
Consider a portfolio consisting of n different crop enterprises. The expected return on the 
portfolio is  
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1 The proposed standing disaster payment program would also provide authority for a permanent livestock 
indemnity program. This program would compensate livestock producers for death losses in excess of normal 
mortality that are caused by adverse weather conditions. The livestock indemnity program is not included in the 
analysis presented here. 
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where  ( ) i r E  is the expected return for crop i,  i w is the proportion of the total value of the 








For a portfolio consisting of two crops, j and k, the variance in returns for the portfolio 
would be measured as: 
(2) 
where  k j, r  is the correlation coefficient between returns on crop j and crop k. By changing the 
notation for variance from
2
crop s to crop crop, s , equation 2 can be generalized to allow for portfolios 
of more than two crops: 
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Following standard financial theory we assume that farmers manage their portfolios by 
making decisions that weigh expected returns against risk.  Specifically, it is assumed that 
farmers maximize a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, which is represented 
mathematically as 
(4) 
1   r    if ) ln(     E(U)
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where r is a risk aversion coefficient and ωt is the weight associated with each possible wealth 
outcome t.  If  0 W  represents initial wealth then  t t NR W W + = 0  where  t NR  is a stochastic annual 
net return, which in the present context would include returns from crop production, commodity 
program payments, crop insurance indemnities, and disaster program payments.  
k j k j k j k k j j portfolio w w w w ,
2 2 2 2 2 2 r s s s s s + + =  7 
The commodity program payments included in the analysis are Direct Payments (DPs), 
Loan Deficiency Payments (LDPs), and Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCPs).  For each program 
crop, commodity program payments, crop insurance indemnities, and disaster program payments 
are modeled as follows.  LDPs are calculated as: 
(5)  f y PA MYA LR LDPs ´ ´ - = ) , 0 max(  
where LR is the loan rate, MYA is the marketing year average price, PA is planted acres, and  f y  
is the realized farm yield.
2  DPs are calculated as: 
(6)  f R y BA DP DP ´ ´ ´ = % 85  
where DPR is the direct payment rate, BA is the base acreage, and  f y is the program yield.  CCPs 
are calculated as: 
(7)  ( ) ( ) f R TP y BA MYA LR DP CCP CCP ´ ´ ´ - - = % 85 , max  
where CCPTP is the target price and all other variables are as defined previously. 
Crop yield insurance is modeled at coverage levels ranging from 50 to 85 percent 
coverage in five percent increments – as in the actual crop insurance program.  Indemnities are 
computed as:   
(8)  ( ) ( ) [ ] f f y APH CL EP Indemnity - ´ ´ = , 0 max  
 
where EP is the crop insurance pre-planting expected price, CL is the coverage level, and APHf  
is the farm’s crop insurance actual production history (APH) yield.  The crop insurance products 
are assumed to be actuarially-fair so the associated federal transfer is simply the premium 
                                                 
2 LDPs are actually paid based on posted county prices at the time the LDP is exercised.  However, to simplify the 
modeling we use MYA instead of posted county prices.  Assuming markets are efficient, this simplifying 
assumption should not greatly bias the results.    8 
subsidy, which currently ranges from 67 percent for the 50 percent coverage level to 38 percent 
for the 85 percent coverage level.
3 
The standing disaster payment program proposed in the Senate legislation is designed to 
































































where i represents the farm’s crop enterprises.  The first term on the right-hand side of the 
equation is the guarantee equal to 115 of the insured value of all crops. Thus, choosing higher 
crop insurance coverage levels results in a higher disaster guarantee.
4  The second term on the 
right-hand side is the sum across crops of revenue per acre plus 20 percent of all direct payments 
per acre plus crop insurance indemnities per acre.   
Once the net returns are calculated, certainty equivalents (CEs) can be calculated by 
inverting equation 4.  The CE represents the highest sure payment a decision maker would be 
willing to take to avoid a risky outcome (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson, 1997).  For any two 
alternatives l and m, if CEl > CEm, then alternative l is preferred to m.   
For this investigation, the optimal crop insurance coverage level is that which results in 
the highest CE.  Comparing optimal coverage levels with and without the proposed disaster 
                                                 
3 Free catastrophic coverage crop insurance is available with a 50 percent guarantee with the crop value capped at 55 
percent of the expected price. 
4 Note the guarantee is capped at 90% of expected crop revenue.   9 
payment will reveal what effect, if any, the disaster program is likely to have on insurance 
purchase decisions.  The equations for calculating the CE from the CRRA utility functions used 
here are: 
(10)  ( ) [ ]
1 r if




















where U  is a value for utility calculated from equation 4. 
   
Data and Modeling 
A stochastic simulation model is developed to evaluate crop insurance indemnities and disaster 
program payouts for a representative Mississippi cotton-soybean-corn farm, a representative 
Illinois soybean-corn farm and a representative Kansas wheat-corn farm.  Certainty equivalents 
are calculated for each crop insurance coverage level from 50 to 85 percent both with and 
without the proposed disaster payment program to determine any impact of the program on 
optimal crop insurance purchase decisions by producers.  For the Mississippi farm the effect of 
the disaster program is evaluated assuming production of all cotton, all soybeans, all corn, and a 
mix of cotton, soybeans and corn.  For the Illinois farm, the program is evaluated assuming 
production of all soybeans, all corn, and a mix of the two.  Similarly, for the Kansas farm, all 
wheat, all corn, and an equal mix of the two are modeled. 
To accurately assess the potential impacts of the proposed disaster program, it is 
necessary to model returns from crop production, existing government programs (i.e., direct 
payments, counter-cyclical payments, and loan deficiency payments), and crop insurance as well 
as from the proposed program.  Simulating outcomes for these different revenue streams requires   10 
the simulation of a relatively large number of variables including futures prices, cash prices, 
farm-level yields, and county-level yields for each of the crops considered.    
The price data used in the model consist of beginning and ending prices as defined in the 
crop revenue coverage (CRC) insurance product provisions
5 as well as harvest time cash prices 
and marketing year average prices.  Both county-level and farm-level yields are simulated in this 
model.  Clearly, farm-level yields are required to calculate crop returns, crop insurance 
indemnities, and loan deficiency payments.  County-level yields are simulated in order to define 
an event triggering a disaster program payment.  If county-level yields for any crop fall below a 
defined threshold, a disaster declaration will be assumed.  Under the proposed program, a 
disaster declaration for the county is a necessary first condition for producers in the county to be 
eligible for disaster payments.   
To simulate price outcomes, a beginning futures price was assumed for each crop.  
Futures price changes over the production season and harvest time basis values were simulated 
using parameters calculated from historic data obtained from the Commodity Research Bureau 
(CRB) database.  This information was used to calculate ending futures prices and harvest time 
cash prices (as well as a marketing year average price) for each crop.  Yields were simulated 
from a Beta distribution, with parameters of the distribution for each crop derived from historic 
data.  County yields are from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural 
Statistics Service while farm yields are derived from the county-level series using the method 
described in Coble and Barnett (2007).  Correlations between yields, futures price changes, and 
                                                 
5 The CRC Commodity Exchange Endorsement describes how base (i.e., beginning) and harvest (i.e., ending) prices 
are to be established for each crop and location.  For example, for corn, in counties with a March 15 cancellation 
date for CRC policies, the base price is the average daily settlement price on the Chicago Board of Trade’s 
December corn contract during the month of February.  The harvest price is the average daily settlement price on 
that same contract during the month of October.  Additional details about the beginning and ending prices used in 
this study can be found in the CRC Commodity Exchange Endorsement (USDA Risk Management Agency).   11 
basis values were also included in the simulation.  Data for Mississippi covered the period from 
1979 through 2004.  Data for Illinois and Kansas covered the period from 1975 through 2004.  
Table 1 provides names and descriptive statistics for the data used in the Mississippi 
representative farm model.   
A total of 100,000 correlated price changes, basis values, and yields were simulated for 
each representative farm.  Correlated price variables were simulated using the procedure 
described by Phoon, Quek, and Huang (2004).  In this procedure, a rank (Spearman) correlation 
matrix, r r r rs, is calculated.  An Eigen decomposition of r r r rs results in a matrix of Eigen values e  and 
Eigen vector e ˆ.  Correlated standard normal deviates (Z ˆ ) are generated using: 
(11)   e e ˆ ˆ Z Z = , 
where Z is a vector of independent standard normal deviates.  These correlated standard normal 
deviates are converted to correlated uniform deviates on the (0,1) interval by a transformation on 
the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  The uniform deviates are used as 
probabilities in an inverse transformation on each of the marginal distributions for the variables 
being simulated (in this case, price changes, basis values, and yields).   The notable feature of 
this simulation routine is that is allows the simulation of correlated variables with mixed 
marginal distributions, permitting the simulation of correlated prices and yields.   
Simulated prices and yields, are used to calculate crop returns, crop insurance 
indemnities, government payments (e.g., LDPs and counter-cyclical payments), and any 
payments under the proposed disaster payment program.  To calculate the direct and counter-
cyclical payments, crop base acres and yields must be assumed.  In this model, base acres and 
planted acres are assumed to be the same.  All three representative farms are assumed to have 
3,000 acres of cropland.    12 
Returns from all sources are converted to utility values using the constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) utility function shown in equation 4.  Utility values are calculated for a risk 
aversion coefficient of 2, representing a moderately risk-averse decision maker.  Initial wealth is 
assumed to be $50,000. Certainty equivalents (CEs) for crop insurance coverage levels from 
50% to 85% are then calculated to define the optimal coverage level both with and without the 
disaster payment program.  
The model developed here can also be used to compare the relative impact of the 
proposed disaster payment program across geographic regions and across different levels of 
diversification.  For each representative farm, average annual disaster program payments will be 
computed for each crop mix modeled.  We hypothesize that, for the same crop, disaster payments 
will be lower for the Illinois representative farm than for either the Mississippi or Kansas farms.  
Likewise, we expect that disaster payments will be lower for more diversified farms since the 
disaster payment trigger is based on whole farm revenue, which should be less variable on a 
diversified operation.  
To gain further insight into geographic differences in potential disaster payments, the 
model developed here is then modified to compute payments under a hypothetical program that 
provides protection at the level of 70 percent of expected whole farm revenue.
6  In this 
comparison, an actuarially-fair premium rate for 70 percent whole farm coverage is calculated 
for the Mississippi farm.  For the Illinois and Kansas farms, a grid search is performed to find the 
whole farm coverage level that would correspond to the actuarially-fair premium rate for 70 
percent coverage on the Mississippi farm.  This exercise illustrates the degree to which imposing 
                                                 
6 The rationale for establishing a 70% whole farm coverage program is that such a program would be considered 
WTO green box.     13 
consistent coverage levels across dissimilar geographic regions actually leads to inequities in 
program payouts due to differences in production risk. 
Results and Discussion 
Simulation results for the Mississippi, Illinois, and Kansas representative farms are presented in 
Tables 2, 3, and 4, respectively. With respect to the issue of disaster program effects on crop 
insurance purchase decisions, it does not appear that optimal crop insurance coverage levels are 
influenced by the availability of the disaster program.  Payments under the disaster program are 
relatively small in relation to crop insurance indemnities at all coverage levels – too small to 
affect certainty equivalents by enough to shift the optimal coverage level by 5 percentage points.  
Note that a grid search over finer increments of coverage would likely reveal some small 
difference in the true optimal coverage; however, the coverage levels modeled here are the only 
ones that are relevant to the actual crop insurance purchase decision. 
   Results in all three tables demonstrate an effect of diversification on disaster program 
payments.  In general, disaster payments are higher for a single crop compared to the diversified 
crop situation.  The exception to this is that disaster payments are smaller for soybeans in Illinois 
as a single crop than for the corn/soybean crop combination. This likely reflects the relatively 
low yield risk for Illinois soybeans along with the relatively low revenue guarantee associated 
with that crop.  In Mississippi, the revenue guarantee on soybeans would still be relatively low, 
but yield risk is considerably greater compared to Illinois.  Specifically, the simulated coefficient 
of variation on farm-level yield for soybeans in Mississippi is 0.579 while in Illinois it is 0.221. 
  To further investigate geographic differences in disaster program experience, the model 
developed here was used to calculate an implied premium rate for a disaster program that makes   14 
payments whenever realized whole farm revenue is less than some percentage of the expected 
whole farm revenue.  That is, the producer would receive the following revenue guarantee (RG): 
(12)  ∑ · =
i
i i i ac p E y E CL RG ] [ ] [ , 
where E[yi] is the expected yield for crop i, E[pi] is the expected price for crop i (represented by 
the beginning futures price defined in crop insurance provisions), aci is the number of acres 
planted to crop i, and CL is the percent of expected revenue guaranteed by the program.  In this 
analysis, premium rates are calculated for coverage levels of 50, 60, and 70 percent.  To begin, in 
order to focus more directly on geographic differences in program payments, planting of only the 
dominant crop is considered: cotton for the Mississippi farm, corn for the Illinois farm, and 
wheat for the Kansas farm.  Premium rates estimated for each farm and coverage level are 
reported in Table 5. Not surprisingly, premium rates are much higher in Kansas than in Illinois, 
with rates for Mississippi falling between (though much closer to the Illinois rates than to the 
Kansas rates).  These results illustrate significant differences in premium rates across geographic 
regions due to differences in revenue risk across regions and, of course, crops.  
Further analysis was conducted to incorporate the effects of crop diversification on 
premium rate for the hypothetical disaster program covering 70 percent of expected whole farm 
revenue.  For the Mississippi representative farm (in the case of a diversified crop mix with equal 
plantings of cotton, soybeans, and corn), the actuarially fair premium rate for a program covering 
70% of expected crop revenue would be about 2.66%.  For the Illinois representative farm (also 
assuming a diversified crop mix), a grid search was performed to determine the coverage level 
that would correspond to a 2.66% premium rate.  That coverage level is about 82%.  For the   15 
Kansas diversified farm, the coverage level corresponding to the Mississippi premium rate is just 
23.5%.   
Differences in premium rates noted above largely reflect differences in production risk 
across regions.  For example, despite the fact that the Mississippi farm is more diversified than 
the Illinois farm, the implied premium rate for 70% coverage in Mississippi is too high for that 
same level of (whole-farm) coverage in Illinois.   Production risk is lower in the heart of the 
Corn Belt than in the Mid-South.  On the other hand, the Mississippi implied premium rate is far 
too low for the Kansas farm, reflecting both the reduced amount of diversification on that farm 
and the higher risk associated with production in the Southern Plains.   
Another factor – in addition to level of diversification and production risk – that will 
influence differences in implied premium rates is price/yield correlation differences across 
locations.  A negative price/yield correlation has the effect of reducing variability in farm-level 
revenue.  Table 6 presents price/yield correlations for the crops and locations.  Consistent with 
the implied premium rates noted above, negative correlations are highest in Illinois and lowest in 
Kansas, with Mississippi correlations falling between. 
The significance of these results comparing implied premium rates is that they highlight 
the inherent inequity of government programs that impose consistent coverage levels (or revenue 
triggers) across regions that may differ greatly in terms of production risk.  Similarly, imposing 
consistent coverage across different levels of diversification can also be problematic.  Note the 
quite large difference between the actuarially-fair premium rates for the diversified Mississippi 
farm (2.66%) compared to the cotton-only Mississippi farm (6.39%).  Viewed another way, the 
actuarially fair premium rate for 70% coverage on the diversified Mississippi farm corresponds   16 
to a coverage level of just 58% in the case where cotton is the only crop grown on the 
Mississippi farm. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The standing disaster payment program proposed in the Senate version of the 2008 Farm Bill 
represents an attempt by the federal government to provide a systematic means of compensating 
producers for losses associated with production (as opposed to price) shortfalls.  Because the 
revenue trigger established under this proposed program is tied to the producer’s crop insurance 
coverage level and because the program would function in much the same way as a crop 
insurance product, it is quite possible that the program could influence crop insurance purchase 
decisions. 
  Results of this research suggest that payments under this disaster program, as proposed, 
would not be likely to affect optimal crop insurance coverage levels.  Payments are, on average, 
small relative to crop insurance indemnities – too small to exert much influence on the choice of 
insurance coverage level.   
  Further results of this study illustrate the influence of crop diversification and production 
risk on payments under this program.  In general, the program will pay more to less diversified 
operations in areas characterized by greater production risk.  This may seem an intuitively 
obvious finding, but it has implications for the distribution of farm program benefits that are 
often overlooked or ignored by policy makers.  To more clearly demonstrate the implications of 
this issue, a comparison of actuarially fair premium rates for Mississippi, Illinois, and Kansas 
representative farms was conducted.  In this comparison, an implied actuarially fair premium rate 
for a hypothetical disaster program with a 70 percent whole-farm revenue guarantee was 
calculated for a diversified (cotton, soybeans, and corn) Mississippi farm.  That rate was found to   17 
be consistent with a coverage level of 79 percent for a diversified (soybeans and corn) Illinois 
farm and only 23.5 percent for a diversified (wheat and corn) Kansas farm.  This example 
highlights the inequity that is inherent in programs (such as the proposed disaster program 
modeled in this study) that establish fixed coverage across very diverse production regions.   18 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics of Date used in Representative Farm Models 
  Mississippi  Illinois  Kansas 
Variable   Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Beginning Futures Prices 
  Cotton  65.456  9.112 
  Soybeans  6.236  0.957  6.155  0.918 
  Corn  2.605  0.392  2.633  0.369  2.633  0.369 
  Wheat          3.544  0.609 
Ending Futures Prices 
  Cotton  63.955  12.605 
  Soybeans  6.101  1.115  6.030  1.080 
  Corn  2.497  0.539  2.477  0.468  2.477  0.468 
  Wheat          3.447  0.677 
Marketing Year Average Prices 
  Cotton  58.296  10.495 
  Soybeans  5.944  0.976  5.961  0.949 
  Corn  2.359  0.420  2.343  0.398  2.343  0.398 
  Wheat          3.253  0.561 
Cash (Harvest) Prices 
  Cotton  59.362  9.822 
  Soybeans  5.984  0.954  5.808  0.972 
  Corn  2.638  0.484  2.264  0.429  2.356  0.430 
  Wheat          3.100  0.667 
Farm-level Yields 
  Cotton   1,049.8  348.4 
  Soybeans  38.6  22.3  47.3  10.4 
  Corn  140.1  63.4  165.9  37.4  97.3  84.5 
  Wheat          27.6  19.3 
County-level Yields 
  Cotton  1,015.5  123.6 
  Soybeans  37.3  5.4  49.5  5.4 
  Corn  142.6  10.9  165.9  23.4  97.1  31.4 
  Wheat          26.4  9.0 
Note: Cotton prices given in cents/lb.  Soybean and corn prices given in $/bushel.  Cotton  
data are from 1979-2004.  Illinois and Kansas data are from 1975-2004. 
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Table 2.  Disaster Program Summary: Mississippi Cotton, Soybean, Corn Farm 
 
   21 
Table 3.  Disaster Program Summary: Illinois Corn and Soybean Farm 
 
 
   22 
Table 4.  Disaster Program Summary: Kansas Wheat and Corn Farm 
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Table 5.  Actuarially Fair Premium Rates for Three Different Expected Revenue Coverage 
Levels on Representative Mississippi, Illinois, and Kansas Farms 
  Farm
a 
Coverage Level  Mississippi  Illinois  Kansas 
50%  1.002%  0.264%  17.320% 
60%  3.178%  1.017%  20.298% 
70%  6.390%  2.657%  23.194% 
a Planting is assumed to be to a single crop: cotton for the Mississippi farm, corn for the Illinois farm, and wheat for 
the Kansas farm. 
   24 
Table 6.  Price/Yield Correlations for Mississippi, Illinois, and Kansas Representative Farms 
  Cotton  Soybean  Corn  Wheat  Cotton  Soybean  Corn  Wheat 
  Price  Price  Price  Price  Yield  Yield  Yield  Yield 
Mississippi 
Cotton Price  1.00 
Soybean Price  0.63  1.00 
Corn Price  0.58  0.73  1.00 
Cotton Yield  -0.09  -0.11  0.18    1.00 
Soybean Yield  -0.21  -0.27  -0.14    0.09  1.00 
Corn Yield  -0.27  -0.42  -0.26    -0.11  0.194  1.00 
 
Illinois 
Soybean Price    1.00 
Corn Price    0.84  1.00 
Soybean Yield    -0.33  -0.08      1.00 
Corn Yield    -0.53  -0.49      0.07  1.00 
 
Kansas 
Corn Price      1.00 
Wheat Price      0.68  1.00 
Corn Yield      0.17  0.28      1.00 
Wheat Yield      -0.40  -0.44      -0.20  1.00 
Note: Prices used for all crops are harvest time cash prices for the location specified.  Yields are 
farm level yields. 